Suchergebnisse

The role of the electromagnetic spectrum in all manner of military operations is increasing. The same can be said for all aspects of our everyday civilian lives. Consequently, demand on the spectrum, both by the military and for civilian purposes, is increasing. The spectrum, while fully renewable, is not unlimited at any one point in time and allocation of the spectrum for optimum utilisation is key. This is raising a range of issues. Questions arise both because of the role of autonomous capabilities in devices that make use of the spectrum, which have the potential to create demand and interference challenges, and because of the valuable role that autonomous capabilities may play in managing the spectrum itself. This paper looks at attempts to use automation technologies to better utilise and manage the spectrum while noting the challenges created by signal interference and the 'dual-use' nature of this valuable resource.

AbstractIn the last decade considerable expense has been invested in non-lethal weapons development programmes, including by the United States military and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and members of the European Working Group Non-Lethal Weapons. This paper acknowledges the potential suitability of non-lethal weapons for specific situations arising on the battlefield, but cautions against those who advocate for any weakening of existing international humanitarian law frameworks to provide for greater employment of non-lethal technologies.

AbstractThe Responsibility to Protect is being touted as a new approach to protecting populations from mass atrocities. Certainly it would be encouraging to believe that an end to genocides, large scale ethnic cleansing and large scale loss of life were within humanity's reach. However, whilst the holistic approach of the doctrine is to be commended, the legality of the proposal requires further analysis. This paper specifically addresses the evolution of the legality of humanitarian intervention and looks at whether the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advances the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends.

Common Article 1 : an introduction / Eve Massingham and Annabel McConnachie -- The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols / Jonathan Crowe -- Ensuring respect for IHL in the international community : Navigation expectations for humanitarian law diplomacy by third States not a party to an armed conflict / Sarah McCosker -- Parliamentary scrutiny committees' contribution to the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL / Lara Pratt -- Ensuring respect for IHL by, and in relation to, the conduct of private actors / Catherine Drummond -- Ensuring respect for IHL by Kenya and Uganda in South Sudan : a case study / Kenneth Wyne Mutuma -- Ensuring respect and targeting / Dale Stephens -- Weapons and the obligation to ensure respect for IHL / Eve Massingham -- Artificial Intelligence and the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for IHL / Hitoshi Nasu -- The obligation to ensure respect for IHL in the peacekeeping context : progress, lessons and opportunities / Leanne Smith -- The obligations to ensure respect in relation to detention in armed conflict / Kelisiana Thynne -- CA1 and counter-terrorism legislation : challenges and opportunities in an increasingly divided world / Yvette Zegenhagen and Petra Ball -- Ensuring respect for IHL as it relates to humanitarian activities / Nathalie Weizmann -- The nature of the obligation to ensure respect under IHL for people displaced as a result of armed conflict / Linda Ngesa -- Challenges in the application of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL : foreign fighters as an example / Marnie Lloydd -- The external dimension of CA1 and the creation of International Criminal Tribunals / Parisa Zangeneh -- Conclusion / Eve Massingham and Annabel McConnachie.

Abstract
The obligations of international humanitarian law are not limited to the attacker; the defender is also required to take steps to protect civilians from harm. The requirement to take precautions against the effects of attack requires the defender to minimize the risk that civilians and civilian objects will be harmed by enemy military operations. At its most basic, it obliges defenders to locate military installations away from civilians. Furthermore, where appropriate, the status of objects should be clearly marked. It is – somewhat counterintuitively – about making it easier for the attacker to select lawful targets by making visible the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives.
The increasing importance of digital infrastructure to modern life may make complying with these precautionary obligations more complicated. Maintaining separation between military and civilian networks is challenging as both operate using at least some of the same infrastructure, relying on the same cables, systems, and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the speed at which operations against digital infrastructure can occur increases the difficulty of complying with the obligation – particularly if such operations involve a degree of automation or the use of artificial intelligence (ai).
This paper sets out the source and extent of the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations and considers how they might apply to digital infrastructure. As well as clarifying the extent of the obligation, it applies the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations to digital infrastructure, giving examples of where systems designers are taking these obligations into account, and other examples of where they must.

In the last ten years or so, the international community has seen an increase in the suppression of revolutionaries or insurrectionists by authoritarian regimes. There has also been a growing urbanisation of violence, in which gangs infiltrate urban societies due to a lack of provision of State services. This landscape of violence continually morphs from one dominated by armed conflicts (to which international humanitarian law (ihl) applies) to one that increasingly involves 'other situations of violence' which fall short of the threshold of armed conflict (and which are not regulated by ihl). These 'other situations of violence', whilst wildly disparate in many ways, share the tragedy (also shared with armed conflict) of the impediments they place on access to health care by those left vulnerable as a result of the breakdown of domestic legal order. This paper reviews existing laws and principles, which could apply to 'other situations of violence' such as those found in ihl and human rights law. It makes the case that an international framework could have a stronger presence in the regulation of 'other situations of violence', in order to ensure the protection of those who need it most.

AbstractAround 50 million people across the world are affected by urban warfare. When conflict occurs in cities, the natural environment has historically been relegated to an afterthought, but both the immediate and long-term environmental consequences of urban warfare are serious. This article looks at actions that can be taken to protect the natural environment – and through this, the population – against the effects of urban warfare when fighting in urban areas. It is intended to be a part of the conversation about what parties to armed conflict can and should do to give effect to their legal obligations under international humanitarian law and international law more broadly, with a specific focus on the natural environment when fighting in urban areas.